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Abstract. This study is aimed to analyse the role played by the so called 
“democratic conditionality clause” into the Bilateral Association Agreements 
signed by the EU and the Mediterranean Partners, within the broader framework 
of the EU’s Development Policy and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. 
The theme will be developed on three different and interlinked dimensions: first 
of all on the activity deployed by the EU to promote democracy in North Africa; 
secondly, on the specific problems and characteristics of democratization 
processes in North Africa; finally and mainly on the Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership (EMP), regarded as the multilateral context within which EU’s 
policies meet North African instances. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“... turning the Mediterranean basin into an area of dialogue, exchange and
cooperation guaranteeing peace, stability and prosperity requires a
strengthening of democracy and respect for human rights, sustainable and
balanced economic and social development, measures to combat poverty and
promotion of greater understanding between cultures …” 
 
Barcelona Declaration - Preamble 
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The aim of this study relates to democratization processes, namely to the 
analysis of democracy promotion policies of an international actor, the European 
Union (EU), in a specific area, North Africa. 
It is structured so as to taking into account all the various factors and 
considerations pertinent to the external dimensions of democratization: therefore 
it will try to assess the nature of European policies, the motives behind the 
approaches to the democracy promotion adopted by the EU, the effectiveness of 
the European action in this field , moreover it will try to understand the North 
African perspectives on the EU’s democracy promotion commitments and to 
explore the political implication of the impact that the European policy had had 
on social, political and economic conditions in North Africa, finally it will take into 
account the prominent role played  by civil society in favouring “an unstoppable 
spread of democratic norms.”
1 
The work will be developed on three different and interlinked dimensions: 
first of all on the activity deployed by the EU to promote democracy in North 
Africa; secondly, on the specific problems and characteristics of democratization 
processes in North Africa; finally and mainly on the Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership (EMP), regarded as the multilateral context within which EU’s policies 
meet North African instances. 
Anyway the main set of questions which will be assessed in this study, 
relates to the way in which an international actor in general, and the European 
Union in particular, can most effectively help to construct high quality and 
balanced democratic institutions. Precisely this study is aimed to analyse the role 
played by the so called “democratic conditionality clause” into the Bilateral 
Association Agreements signed by the EU and the Mediterranean Partners, within 
the broader framework of the EU’s Development Policy and of the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership.  
 
1 R.GILLESPIE-R.YOUNGS, “Themes in European Democracy promotion”, in  Democratization, Volume 9, Spring 
2002, Number 1, Special Issue: “The European Union and Democracy Promotion: The Case of North Africa”, 
edited by R. Gillespie and R. Youngs, page 1. 
 
 
  3CHAPTER 1 
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT POLICY IN 
THE MEDITERRANEAN REGION. 
 
1.1 THE BARCELONA PROCESS. 
 
The Mediterranean Basin has always been an area of fruitful chances of 
encounter among peoples , cultures and civilities
2, but it has also been a hot 
scenario for dramatic political and cultural tensions and conflicts, mainly after the 
end of the ancient equilibriums created by the Cold War; the fall of the Berlin 
Wall determined a situation of un-stability and of political uncertainty, which 
increased the range of risk for peace and stability in the Mediterranean region, in 
Europe and therefore for  the entire International Community. 
Then it is not surprising that the Euro-Mediterranean Policy has always 
been a key priority in EU’s external relations, because “the new political, 
economic and social issues on both sides of the Mediterranean constitute 
common challenges calling for a coordinated overall response.”
3  
 
The European Union's proximity policy towards the Mediterranean region 
is governed by the global and comprehensive Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership launched at the 1995 Barcelona Conference, between the 
European Union and its 12 Mediterranean Partners (Algeria, Palestinian Authority, 
Cyprus, Egypt, Jordan, Israel, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, and 
Turkey). 
The Barcelona Conference was the final result of the new EU’s declared  
intention to re-launch its Mediterranean policy:  the Barcelona Declaration marks 
the start into a new "partnership" phase including bilateral and multilateral or 
regional cooperation. 
 
Actually the EU’s commitment in the Mediterranean basin is not recent,  in 
fact it founds its legal basis in the EC Treaty, signed in Rome in 1957, which is 
mainly aimed to improve the economic and political relationships among Europe 
and the Mediterranean Third Countries,  
In this perspective the European Community, in order to promote the 
development of the latter and to consolidate the European prominence in such a 
strategic region
4, established a common commercial policy according to the 
general rule contained in Article 113 of the Rome Treaty
5. 
This First Phase of the European policy in the Mediterranean Basin is 
characterized by the previous colonialist relations entertained by some European 
countries (in particular France and Spain) with most of the North African 
Countries: the European Community, according to article 113 signed with its 
                                                 
2 Barcelona Declaration, Preamble, first paragraph. 
3 Barcelona Declaration, Preamble, third paragraph. 
4 RIZZI, “Unione europea  e Mediterraneo”. La Nuova Scientifica Italiana, Roma 1997. Page 19. 
5 The EC treaty does not contain, with the exception of some articles, namely articles 131-136, specific 
provisions regarding the Mediterranean dialogue EC Treaty. 
  4aspirant member States (i.e. Greece) and North African former colonies 
commercial agreements and  Association Agreements which, in the opinion of 
someone
6, were mainly designed to consolidate ancient influences. 
 
In 1972 the European Commission, also by following the position taken 
by the European Parliament
7, realized a document in which it promotes an 
unitary approach to the issue of the Euro-Mediterranean policy and indicates the 
key elements of the so called Global Mediterranean Policy ( improved export 
from North Africa to the  EC; economic, financial and technical co-operation, and 
institutional assistance). 
The failure of the Global Mediterranean Policy , which continued until the 
eighties, is due to various factors: first of all to the post-colonialist approach 
performed by the EC, secondly to the fear felt by the EC’s southern member 
States to protect their production during the economic crisis of the seventies    
(someone
8 speaks of “protectionist approach” of the EC), and finally to the 
internal contradictions which characterized the commercial policy designed after 
the enlargement and the association agreements. 
 
The Single European Act
9 enlarged the EC’s competences and provided 
specific rules on foreign policy and, in the period comprised between 1988 and 
1991, the EC’s institutions elaborated a new form of Euro-Mediterranean co-
operation
10: the so called Renewed Mediterranean Policy. 
This new phase in the EC’s policy of “proximity” towards the 
Mediterranean Basin
11 focuses on commercial co-operation and on programs of 
financial assistance
12 (Med Programs: MedCampus, MedInvest, MedUrb) which 
produced good performances
13 but  it does not provide any agreement on 
development although it promotes a deeper general co-operation and 
strengthens the political dialogue into the region. 
In 1991 the new political scenario created by the Fall of the Berlin Wall 
called for a re-thinking on the EC’s  role: the European Parliament, which was 
worried about the unbalanced economic and social development which was 
affecting the Mediterranean region and by the increasing presence of Islamic 
fundamentalism, expressed its urgent commitment in improving from a 
quantitative and a qualitative point of view the dialogue between the Southern 
and the Northern sides of the Mediterranean Sea, with the aim of ensuring peace 
and stability. 
 
The acknowledgement that the goal of peace, stability and development 
could not be reached only by implementing forms of economic co-operation led 
                                                 
6 RIZZI, “Unione europea  e Mediterraneo”. La Nuova Scientifica Italiana, Roma 1997. Page 25. 
7 Parliament’s Resolutions  of January  and 9 February 1971.  
8 A.R. DI SERIO “ La Cooperazione Euro-Mediterranea e la Dichiarazione di Barcellona”. In Rivista di Diritto 
Europeo, 1996, fascicolo 4, volume 36,  page 702. 
9 signed in 1986 and entered into force in 1987 
10 Communications of the Commission to the Council of Ministers of 30-09-1989 and of 1-06-1990.  
11 Nicosia Conference, 1990. 
12 RIZZI, “Unione europea  e Mediterraneo”. La Nuova Scientifica Italiana, Roma 1997. Page 52. 
13 Idem page 55. 
  5to the present stage of the EC’s policy towards the Mediterranean Basin, which 
aims to create a broad political dialogue based on the respect of human rights, 
democracy, peace and stability: the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 
launched at the Barcelona Declaration in 1995 represents the main result of a 
such recognition. 
 
The idea of an Euro-Mediterranean Partnership took place in 1992 with 
the EC’s commitment in the Maghreb region, which was extended to the entire 
Mediterranean Basin in 1994, and which was fully expressed during the Essen 
European Council: finally the European Commission in a Communication
14 
realized a set of concrete proposals in order to consolidate a real partnership in 
the Mediterranean region. 
 
1.2 THE BARCELONA DECLARATION. 
 
The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership was officially launched in 1995 
during the Barcelona Conference, after 20 years of increasingly intensive 
bilateral trade and development cooperation between the European Union, the 
15 Member States and its 12 Mediterranean Partners (Algeria, Palestinian 
Authority, Cyprus, Egypt, Jordan, Israel, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, 
and Turkey). 
 
The new EC’s Mediterranean policy provides a legal framework which is 
designed to operate in an economically and politically strategic region, which is 
affected by severe and wide problems such as political instability, Islamic 
fundamentalism, migration, security issues, environmental damages, poverty 
eradication, social  and economic under-development. 
Actually  the goal pursued by the EMP’s policy makers appears much 
more difficult to gain if will be evalueted the  fact that the varying notions of 
“community” set out by the scientific literature do not work in the case of Euro-
Med: “the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) is less a project of regional co-
operation, and more one of inter-regional co-operation undertaken between 
regions and countries divided by basic political, social, economic, cultural 
differences”
15. 
Thus, if regionalism in the  EU’s approach to external policy  is “an 
instrument of international governance consciously intended to reduce political 
and economic gaps through a process of socialisation”
16 the EMP can be 
considered as a region-building process first of all devoted to the build up of a 
common language on basic issues: “because of the cross-cultural nature of the 
Euro-Med framework, socially relevant concepts may be called the same thing 
                                                 
 
14 Communication of the Commission 19/10/1994. 
15 R. ALIBONI EuroMeSCo paper  31 “Common Languages on Democracy in the Euro-Mediterranean 
partnership”. Working Group I Second Year Report.
 
16 Idem 
  6but mean different things. Democracy, human rights or terrorism are good 
examples.”
17 
 
In line with this reasoning, the Euro-Med Partners “convinced that the 
general objective of turning the Mediterranean basin into an area of dialogue, 
exchange and cooperation guaranteeing peace, stability and prosperity requires a 
strengthening of democracy and respect for human rights, sustainable and 
balanced economic and social development, measures to combat poverty and 
promotion of greater understanding between cultures…”
18, “with due regard for 
the characteristics, values and distinguishing features peculiar to each of the 
participants”
19, during the Barcelona Conference signed a shared Declaration in 
which it is affirmed a strong commitment for the  establishment of a global 
partnership articulated in three “baskets” ( the so called EMP volets ): 
 
- the establishment of a common Euro-Mediterranean area of peace and 
stability based on fundamental principles including respect for human rights and 
democracy (political and security partnership); 
 
- the creation of an area of shared prosperity through the progressive 
establishment of a free-trade area between the EU and its Partners and among 
the Mediterranean Partners themselves, accompanied by substantial EU financial 
support for economic transition in the Partners and for the social and economic 
consequences of this reform process (economic and financial partnership); 
 
- the development of human resources, the promotion of understanding 
and dialogue between cultures and rapprochement of the peoples in the Euro-
Mediterranean region as well as to improve the role of civil societies (social, 
cultural and human partnership). 
   
The concrete commitment expressed in the Barcelona Declaration is 
corroborated by a wide and ambitious Plan of Action, also articulated in 
political, economical and cultural dimensions and which asks for concrete actions 
and their implementation. In order to monitor the evolution of the policy, the 
Barcelona Declaration provides a Work Programme which defines four 
categories of instruments : periodic meetings of the foreign affairs ministers
20 of 
the EMP participants; the Euro-Mediterranean Committee for the Barcelona 
Process; the appropriate departments and directorate-generals of the European 
Commission; and  finally ad hoc meetings will be direct by Senior  Officials 
specialized in specific EMP’s actions. 
 
                                                 
17 Idem 
18 Barcelona Declaration, Preamble, sixth paragraph. 
19 Barcelona Declaration, Preamble, third paragraph. The same idea is expressed also in Commission’s 
Communications to the European Council and the European Parliament, preparatory to the Malta Conference 
(15-16/04/1997). 
20 Malta , Palermo, Stuttgart, Lisbon, Marseilles, Brussels, Valencia, Crete, Naples and Dublin. The Palermo and 
Lisbon meetings were informal meetings.  
  7The Barcelona Process’s strength is reinvigorated by the legal  nature of 
the Barcelona Declaration, which  is for sure legally binding
21: the Euro-Med 
partners by signing the Final Act of the Conference realized an international 
agreement – even if without adopting the solemn form - which produces legal 
effects, namely it poses international duties on contracting Parties.  
In sum  by signing the Declaration, the Euro-Med Partners are 
internationally bound to take concrete actions in order to implement the targets 
contained in Les trois volets. 
Thus the new outcome of the Euro-Med Partnership is represented by this 
multilateral dimension , which goes over the previous bilateral approach. 
 
1.3 THE PROMOTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY 
WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE EURO-MEDITERRANEAN 
POLITICAL PARTNERSHIP. 
  
The first volet of the Barcelona Declaration, which focuses on the 
political co-operation among the EU and its Mediterranean Partners, 
actually  provides an assessment of political  objectives and strategies; in fact in 
order to reach these ends, the Euro-Med partners , being aware that the 
pursuing of the democracy promotion goal is a common asset, ”agree to 
conduct a strengthened political dialogue at regular intervals based on 
observance of essential principles of international law” and to “act in accordance 
with the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
as well as other obligations under international law”. 
The first volet of the Barcelona Declaration poses at the centre of its 
political commitment the development of rule of law and democracy in 
Euro-Mediterranean Partners’ political systems, as a preparatory strategy which is 
instrumental to the achievement of targets contained in economic and cultural 
partnerships: in fact the participants, in the framework of the third basket, 
“recognize that the traditions of culture and civilization throughout the 
Mediterranean region, dialogue between these cultures and exchanges…are an 
essential factor in bringing their peoples closer” and to this end  “they attach 
particular importance to respect for fundamental social rights, including the right 
to development” and they “will encourage actions of support for democratic 
institutions and for the strengthening of the rule of law and civil society.” 
Although the EM Partners recognize that the promotion of human rights 
and democratization is an essential element of the partnership, cooperation in 
such a delicate field is very difficult to implement, because “the debate on 
democracy and human rights in the Mediterranean is linked to the debate on 
identity and the relations between two civilisations”
22 (see chapter 3). Maybe this 
is way the Barcelona Declaration  turns to a vague formulation on 
                                                 
21 R. SAPIENZA, “Il Partenariato Euro-Mediterraneo. A due anni dalla Conferenza di Barcellona”,in 
Aggiornamenti Sociali, n° 2/1998. Page 150. 
22 EuroMeSCo Report 1997/1998 Chapter III on Human Rights, democracy and civil society. 
  8development of rule of law and democracy: such a formulation in theory 
would appear as addressing its commitment to each single Euro-Med partner; 
instead the subsequent clarification that it is recognized that “in this framework 
the right of each of them [EM Partners]to choose and freely develop its own 
political, socio-cultural, economic and judicial system”, that the Partners must 
refrain from any direct or indirect intervention in the internal affairs of another 
partner and respect the territorial integrity and unity of each of the other 
partners, makes quite evident from one hand, the real ratio of the entire 
paragraph and on the other hand, the real (problematic) question that must be 
assessed in dealing with development policies and  democratization issues: 
political conditionality (see further). 
The ambitious program provided by the first volet  of the Barcelona 
Declaration in democracy promotion should have been put in concrete form by 
the annexed Work Program: its declared aim in fact is “to implement the 
objectives of the Barcelona Declaration, and to respect its principles, through 
regional and multilateral actions”. Unfortunately it does not provide any specific 
action, any concrete measures or detailed guideline: it just states that the above 
mentioned implementation “should start as soon as practical.”
23  
Furthermore it must be recognized that any progress in the 
implementation of the political partnership is first of all subjected to the Middle 
East Crisis’ developments and is hampered by the threat of international 
terrorism and of historical, economical, and cultural factors which are peculiar to 
the Southern side of the Mediterranean Sea (see chapter 3). 
International threats moved by the international terrorism and Middle East 
Crisis  produce a double effect on the Euro-Med political partnership’s progress: 
from one hand, these two factors constitute a sever obstacle to the 
establishment of a dialogue based on thrust and transparency, and therefore 
they postpone the beginning of a  concrete thinking and acting on democracy 
and human rights promotion (see chapter 4, paragraph 4.1); from the other 
hand, the two above mentioned issues have completely - and understandably – 
absorbed the attention of the sub-sequent Euro-Med Conferences
24. As the 
Agenda relative to the political and security partnership, as the Working Activities 
carried on by High Functionaries uncharged of elaborating proposals and 
strategies in order to implement the first volet,  have been entirely devoted to 
the issues of terrorism, peace and international security. The main result which 
was achieved in the period between 1995 and 2003 in improving the  political 
and security dialogue is the debate on the adoption of an Euro-Mediterranean 
Charter for Peace and Stability. 
                                                 
23 Barcelona Declaration, Annex Work Program, Introduction. 
24 Euro-Mediterranean Conferences held in Malta in 1997, Stuttgart in 1999, Marseilles  in 2000. 
  9Nevertheless in 2003 during the Crete Conference, for the first time the 
issue of human rights and democracy promotion received an autonomous 
analysis. 
The  Crete Declaration in fact contains a specific paragraph on 
human rights and democracy in which the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the 
27 participants recognize “the necessity of allowing for an open discussion of 
issues related to human rights and democracy. They welcomed the effort to 
identify areas of common ground for co-operation in legislative and regulatory 
reform as well as implementation of such reforms”.  
In occasion of the sixth Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Foreign 
Affairs Ministers which took place in Naples in December 2003, Europe 
reaffirmed its solidarity with its Mediterranean partners actually by offering “in 
exchange for tangible political and economic reforms, gradual integration into the 
expanded European internal market and the possibility of ultimately reaching the 
EU's four fundamental freedoms.”
25 Despite the fact that the Naples meeting was  
particularly focused on the stagnation of the Middle East Peace Process and on 
the struggle to win peace in Iraq, it provides a tangible outcome on the political 
front of the EMP by launching the establishment of an Euro-Mediterranean 
Parliamentary Assembly which will allow partners to meet on a more formal 
basis with a view to exchange ideas and experience on how a democratic system 
should function. 
 
                                                
Actually the Naples Conference’s Conclusions in conjunction with the 
Valencia Plan of Action and the Barcelona Work Program does constitute the way 
to revive  the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership also by looking at  the upcoming 
Euro-Mediterranean ministerial conference to be held in Cairo on 29 
and 30 November. The main outcome of quadrilateral meeting of the foreign 
ministers of Italy, France, Spain and Portugal – for sure among the EU Member 
States with a stronger Mediterranean sensitivity – was the commitment,  in 
proximity of the 10th anniversary of the Barcelona Declaration in 2005, to 
strengthening of the visibility of the Process and a better perception of the 
European Union's action and engagement in this region on behalf of its peoples 
and civil societies, to assess the Mediterranean partners' experiences in political, 
security and defence dialogue in order to continue to deepen it, and in sum to 
pursue the enrichment of the content of the Barcelona Process, in 
particular on migration issues and economic topics and, in this context, regional 
and sub-regional cooperation, as well as in the social, cultural and human 
sectors. 
1.4 THE EURO-MEDITERRANEAN PARTNERSHIP IN THE 
BROADER FRAMEWORK OF THE EU’s NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY. 
 
25http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/euromed/doc.htm,“Sixth  Euro-Med Ministerial Conference: 
reinforcing and bringing the Partnership forward”. 
  10As the nature and the general aim of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 
is concerned, the EMP itself must be placed and interpreted into the broader 
framework of the New European Union Neighbourhood Policy, simply because 
the EMP constitutes in  a  certain sense a part of it. 
Actually, in the recent  years, the EU has been faced up the challenges 
which arose under the new geographical asset created  from one hand by the 
end of the Cold War, and on the other hand by the enlargement process: EU’s 
boundaries have been changed, from a political and a geographical point  of 
view. Nowadays, after  the enlargement towards Eastern Countries which took 
place in 2004, European Institutions are dealing with the urgency of assessing 
their internal equilibriums , first of all those ones related to new European 
Members States which are able to perform different degree of speed and which 
present  different economic and social systems, and at the same time they are 
called to  face the issues related to the enlarged boundaries - mainly security 
issues and migration flows - which in turn constitute threats to its own stability 
and prosperity. In sum according to the European Commission
26 the “expansion 
to the east has made it necessary for the European Union to formulate an explicit 
neighbourhood policy towards its new proximity”
27.  
The EU’s policy makers, in order to react  to the above mentioned risks, 
look for the establishment  of a convergence on EU’s values and political 
principles inside neighbour countries, despite the fact that they can not relay 
upon the incentive ( the carrot ) of EU membership. Anyway they are  aware 
that Third countries are suffering the increasing cost of exclusion from all the 
benefits linked  to the EU membership
28, moreover it is acknowledged that EU’s 
customs exert a  strong attraction on neighbour countries. It is also true that,  
although the membership incentive  worked quite well  with Eastern countries, it 
is not practicable the idea of going on with the enlargement of the Union.  
The EU’s response to such  a delicate and controversial issue is an 
elaborated comprehensive strategy which offers less than membership and more 
than ordinary partnership, that is a strategy  which involves the so called ring of 
friends
29  in a joined responsibility in  security issues and in a  series of bilateral 
and regional projects of  political and economic cooperation and which turns to 
                                                 
26 Prodi, Romano, 2002, ‘A Wider Europe - A Proximity Policy as the key to stability’, Speech 02/619 delivered at 
‘Peace, Security And Stability: International Dialogue and the Role of the EU’, Sixth ECSA-World Conference, 
Jean Monnet Project, Brussels, 5-6 December and Commission Communication on “Wider Europe-
Neighbourhood: a New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbour”, COM(2003) 104 
final, 11  march 2003. 
27 M. BENEDEK, St Antony’ s College, Oxford.  “From Neighbour to Member or Associate? The Future of the 
European Union’s Neighbourhood Policy “, in EU Policy Network, October 2003 - The Future of the EU’s 
Neighbourhood Policy October 2003. 
28 Idem. 
29 The European Commission and particularly its President, Romano Prodi, have been thinking hard about this. 
In March, they proposed a new framework for the EU’s relations with its eastern and southern neighbours, 
entitled “Wider Europe”. Their ambition is “to develop a zone of prosperity and a friendly neighbourhood – a 
‘ring of friends’ – with whom the EU enjoys close, peaceful and co-operative relations”. In Europe Infos Nr. 55 
(12/2003), Editorial “A ring of friends”. 
  11“political conditionality, a regional approach mixed with national differentiation, 
and flexible implementation reflecting changing political bargains”
30. 
In sum the new Neighbourhood Policy seeks  to  launch a general process 
of region-building which will assist the already existing policies, without 
overriding them; in this sense it could be said that the Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership constitutes the structure which coordinate European Neighbourhood 
Policy and Relations towards North African countries, trough bilateral association 
agreements and  regional projects.  
Actually the  last  enlargement of the EU  had a ”Mediterranean flavour”
31,  
as two previous Euro-Med Partners left the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership in 
order to join the EU membership (Cyprus and Malta) and Turkey – although with 
some uncertainties and difficulties - is on the same way: the outcome of such an 
enlargement, also by taking into account the Eastern expansion, is a situation of 
severe un-equilibrium which makes things even worsen for Southern 
Mediterranean Partners; moreover such a  situation could lead to a loss of some 
peculiarities of  the EMP project as  it  was  conceived in the Barcelona 
Declaration. 
The issue of the effects that the implementation  of a Neighbourhood 
Policy  on the EMP will or can produce is quite complex: it is reasonable to shape 
as severe negative effects, as potential positive ones. In the view of Southern 
EMP’ partners the main risk linked to the implementation of such a policy  is the 
dilution
32 of the specific Euro-Mediterranean relationships’  system within a   
broader framework, which involves countries which do not  share  their 
peculiarities and needs (i.e. Russia), and it in the end could lead to a deeper 
economic  and political marginalisation of North  African countries. Moreover the 
Southern side of the Mediterranean Sea is  even much more worried  of 
becoming a buffer zone
33 between Europe, on one side,  and Africa and Eurasia 
on the other side, especially if security issues are concerned.  
The potential  positive effects which could be linked to the 
implementation  of a Neighbourhood Policy on the EMP are the same which are 
generally inherent to integration processes: first of all, the building up of a single 
coherent political  and legal framework – from the African Dunes to the Siberian 
lands – would lead a spread reinforcement of the effectiveness of EU’s external 
proximity policies, moreover it could facilitate the creation of the  Great Euro-
Mediterranean Market, which in turn could attract Foreign Direct Investments   
flows. 
                                                 
30 Idem. 
31 E.LANNON and P. VAN ELSUWEGE, “The EU’s Emerging Neighbourhood Policy and Its Potential Impact on the 
Euro-Mediterranean partnership”. 
32 Idem. 
33 Idem. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE EUROPEAN UNION'S ROLE IN PROMOTING HUMAN 
RIGHTS AND DEMOCRATISATION IN THIRD 
COUNTRIES. 
2.1 THE LEGAL BASIS 
The European Union’s activities in promoting human rights and 
democracy are based on  the universal principles as laid down in the Universal 
Declaration on Human Rights and its complementary International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and in the main international and 
regional instruments for the protection of human rights, including the European 
Convention on Human Rights
34. 
A considerable step in integrating human rights and democratic principles 
into the policies of the European Union was taken with the entry into force of the 
Treaty on European Union in 1993: the TUE considers as one of the priority 
areas of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy the development and 
consolidation of "democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights 
and fundamental freedoms". Furthermore the new title on development 
cooperation includes a second direct reference to human rights and 
democratization: "Community policy in this area shall contribute to the general 
objective of developing and consolidating democracy and the rule of law and to 
that of respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms". 
 
In 1999 the Amsterdam Treaty marked a deeper EU’s commitment in 
democratization policies and in integrating human rights into the legal order of 
the European Union: the new article 6  reaffirms that the European Union “is 
founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are common to the 
Member States” and according to general principles of  international law 
the EU bears the international obligation to respect those principles 
also in its relationships with other subjects of the International 
Community, then with the receivers of its technical and political 
assistance and of its financial aid in the framework of co-operation in 
development with third Countries. 
 
                                                 
34 Other important sources with regard to defining the priorities of the EU are the declaration and the 
programme of action of the World Conference on Human Rights (Vienna, 1993), the declarations of the 
International Conference on Population and Development (Cairo, 1994), of the World Summit for Social 
Development (Copenhagen, 1995) and of the Fourth World Conference on Women (Beijing 1995). 
  13Therefore The Commission’s action in the field of external relations will be 
guided by compliance with the rights and principles contained in the EU Charter 
of Fundamental Rights  which was officially proclaimed at the Nice Summit 
in December 2000  since this will promote coherence between the EU’s 
internal and external approaches
35: the Treaty of Nice extends the objective of 
promoting the respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms, from 
development co-operation to all forms of co-operation with third countries (Art. 
181bis TEC). 
 
In order to set a comprehensive structure for all European Union’s 
activities in the area of human rights and democracy promotion, the 
Commission has issued since 1995 a series of communications to the 
Council and the Parliament. These communications provide strategies aimed 
at enhancing the consistency and effectiveness of the human rights and 
democratization approach of the European Union ( see paragraph 2.6). 
 
The fundamental Commission’s Communication on the EU’s Role in 
Promoting Human Rights & Democratisation in Third Countries ( 8 May 
2001) mainly focuses on the development of a coherent strategy for EU external 
assistance in the field of democratization; in fact  it does not seek to rewrite the 
EC’s policy in such a field, “rather it seeks to set this policy in the context of the 
Commission's overall strategic approach in external relations”
36, in order to 
ensure that human rights and democracy issues will permeate every EC’s project 
or action in its external relations. 
This approach is grounded on the “universality and indivisibility” of civil, 
political, economic, social, and cultural human rights and makes the protection of 
such rights, together with the promotion of pluralistic democracy and 
effective guarantees for the rule of law and the fight against poverty, the 
EU’s fundamental goals: an essential part in any strategy for development   
relates to the promotion of  human rights, democracy, the rule of law and good 
governance (Joint Statement on the European Community's 
development policy 2)
 37, because democracy’s improvement and institutional 
reforms aimed to enforce the rule of law, on one hand increase development 
opportunities, and on the other hand reduces risks for international peace, 
security and stability: the EC’s Communication in fact stresses the concept of 
“democratic peace”
38, namely the idea that a democratic and  pluralist 
government, which lives in an “environment of international legality”
39 and 
respects the rights of minorities is less likely to resort to nationalism or violence 
                                                 
 
35 European Commission’s communication on the “EU’s Role in Promoting Human Rights & Democratisation in 
Third Countries” ( 8 May 2001), Introduction. 
36 European Commission’s communication on the “EU’s Role in Promoting Human Rights & Democratisation in 
Third Countries” ( 8 May 2001), Introduction. 
37 The Joint Statement was adopted in November 2000 by the Commission and the Council - see further 
paragraph 2.5. 
38 R. ALIBONI EUROMESCO WORKING GROUP ON « The Charter and the search for a Euro-Med common 
ground » -  “CONFLICT PREVENTION” - SEMINAR IN TUNIS 14-15 JUNE 2002.
39 Idem. 
  14as internally, as against its neighbours
40 according to the  fundamental “Kantian 
argument” which display the strong correlation existing between peace and 
democracy. 
 
The Communication identifies all the useful  tools
41  in pursuing the 
democratization goal and three priority areas in which the Community can 
take –and should take- effective actions in supporting human rights and 
democracy: 
 
- “promoting coherent and consistent policies in support of human rights and  
democratisation”; 
- “placing a higher priority on human rights and democratisation in the European 
Union's relations with third countries… by using the opportunities offered by   
political dialogue, trade and external assistance
 
”; 
- adopting a more strategic approach to the European Initiative for Democracy 
and Human Rights (EIDHR).
42 
 
Moreover the EU’s democracy promotion strategy in order to be 
effective should adopt a cross-cutting approach: “respect for human rights 
and democracy should be an integral… consideration in all EU external policies.”
43 
In fact in addition to its activities in the six priority areas ( trade and 
development, regional integration, macroeconomic policies and equitable access 
to social services, transport, food security, institutional capacity building )
44 the 
European Community has identified crosscutting themes that should be 
integrated at every stage and within all of the  Community’s development 
cooperation and external assistance programmes: the first one  among these
45 is 
specifically the promotion of human rights and democracy.
46 
Thus it is essential for the effectiveness of the EU’s democracy promotion 
strategy to launch a positive and constructive partnership with governments, 
because  States are primarily responsible for upholding human rights 
and fundamental freedoms. 
Anyway European institutions involved in development policies  should 
adopt this approach wherever possible, but they should also recognize that in 
                                                 
40 European Commission’s communication on the “EU’s Role in Promoting Human Rights & Democratisation in 
Third Countries” ( 8 May 2001), Introduction. 
41  Firstly classical  tools, such as traditional diplomacy and foreign policy (that is démarches and interventions 
in UN Fora, and sanctions); financial and co-operation instruments , bilateral dialogue,  finally the innovative 
ones, which are instruments in policy areas such the environment, trade, the information society and 
immigration which have the scope to include human rights and democratisation objectives. European 
Commission’s communication on the “EU’s Role in Promoting Human Rights & Democratisation in Third 
Countries” ( 8 May 2001), Chapter 2 “A MORE COHERENT AND CONSISTENT EU APPROACH”. 
42 European Commission’s communication on the “EU’s Role in Promoting Human Rights & Democratisation in 
Third Countries” ( 8 May 2001), Introduction. 
43 European Commission’s communication on the “EU’s Role in Promoting Human Rights & Democratisation in 
Third Countries” ( 8 May 2001), Chapter 3, “INTEGRATING HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRATISATION INTO 
DIALOGUE AND COOPERATION”. 
44 European Commission, Annual Report 20 on the European Community’s Development policy and the 
implementation of external assistance in 2002, chapter 2. 
45 …gender equality, environmental protection, and conflict prevention. 
46 European Commission, Annual Report 2003 on the European Community’s Development policy and the 
implementation of external assistance in 2002, chapter 5. 
  15some cases, third countries may have no genuine commitment to pursue 
change through dialogue and partnership, in these cases  negative 
measures may therefore be more appropriate or at least more effective.  
 
2.2 EUROPEAN INITIATIVE FOR DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS.  
 
Accordingly to the fundamental EC’s Communication of may 2001 one of 
the three priority areas in which the EC could act in order to promote effectively 
democratization processes, relates to the adoption of “a more strategic approach 
to the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR)
47, 
matching programmes and projects in the field with EU commitments on human 
rights and democracy.”
48 
 
Regulations 975/99 and 976/9913 provide the legal basis for the
EIDHR which has the availability of about 100 million euros to support human 
rights, democratisation and conflict prevention activities to be carried out 
primarily in partnership with NGOs and international organisations
 
. 
A number of documents elaborated by the European Parliament 
acknowledges the positive contribution made by the EC towards democratization 
processes, but these documents also underline that the EIDHR need to be more 
transparent and that the impact of EC assistance through the EIDHR is frustrated 
by several factors, which are the same that affect in general the effectiveness of 
the EMP. 
 
Although the first one Thematic Priority of EIDHR, as it is outlined in the  
EC’s 2003 Annual Report on Development policy, regards exactly the adoption of 
actions and the implementation of measures to support democratization, good 
governance and rule of law, actually the European Initiative for democracy and 
human rights in the Southern Mediterranean is financing only two projects
49 
to promote and defend human rights, while the “support for democratization” 
component provides projects to strengthening in the Arab World the role of civil 
societies able to draw on an independent and impartial legal system, and to hold 
governments accountable and denouncing human rights abuses. 
 
Therefore it is absolutely understandable that the European Commission 
stresses that “there is still a need to develop a more strategic approach for the 
EIDHR and its relationship to other instruments”
50 with a view of obtaining 
greater impact, sustainability, and effectiveness in the longer term: in this 
                                                 
47 Chapter B7-7 of the budget. 
48 COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT “the 
European Union’s role in promoting human rights and democratisation in third countries”. Brussels, 8 May 2001 
COM(2001) 252 final. 
49 The first is a Master in human rights foe students coming from Euro-Med Partners, and the second is devoted 
to the promotion of  women’s rights. 
50 COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT “the 
European Union’s role in promoting human rights and democratisation in third countries”. Brussels, 8 May 2001 
COM(2001) 252 final. 
  16perspective it will be essential that the management reforms will be pursued in 
consultation with the Council, the European Parliament and civil society, as well 
as other donors and international organisations. 
The European Commission is strongly confident on the potential good 
outcome of the EIDHR in strengthening the promotion of human rights and 
democracy in third countries, namely EIDHR’ s strategy ( that is: limited thematic 
priorities, focus countries, and flexibility) should focus on its added values, which 
are the following:  
 
- its complementariness to the EC programmes carried out with 
governments, which imply the possibility of implementation with different 
partners ( NGOs and international organisations); 
- it can be used without host government consent; 
- it provides grants that are perceived as having the EU's political backing, 
which can help to protect potentially vulnerable NGOs vis-à-vis 
repressive governments; 
- it is identified with the EU, and reflects and promotes its values, 
such as multilateralism, fundamental rights, democracy and the rule of 
law, and respect for minorities: this aspect improve thrust in popular 
feelings towards external assistance coming from Europe (see chapter 3); 
- finally it can be used to pursue human rights and democratisation 
initiatives on a regional basis. 
 
2.3 THE MEDA DEMOCRACY PROGRAM.  
 
MEDA programmes constitute the  main financial instrument devoted 
to the implementation of the EMP’s targets: they provide  technical and 
financial measures aimed to support structural, economic, and social reforms in 
Mediterranean partners’ systems. 
MEDA programmes work on a double level, regional and bilateral, and 
their resources are subject to programming on a triennial basis
51. 
Council Regulation no EC/1488/96, the so called MEDA Regulation
52, 
provides the legal basis of the MEDA Programme,: it sets out the main areas of 
intervention – which are directly linked to the three EM baskets - and  provides 
rules of functioning for the MED Committee.  
 
In 1996 the European Parliament established a new budgetary line (B-
5070) which is instrumental to the adoption of measures provided in a new 
project specifically intended to promote the rule of law, human rights 
                                                 
51 The first step in programming consists in the establishment of strategy papers covering at the national as at 
the regional level. Based on these papers, three-year national indicative programmes (NIPs) are drawn up by 
each single partner in order to coordinate MEDA activities in the Country, so NIP acts on a bilateral level. Finally 
a regional indicative programme (RIP) covers the multilateral activities. From the NIPs and the RIP annually are 
adopted specific financing plans. The strategy papers, NIPs and the RIP are established in liaison with the 
European Investment Bank.  
European Commission’s communication on the “EU’s Role in Promoting Human Rights & Democratisation in 
Third Countries” ( 8 May 2001). 
52 It was amended in 2000 (MEDA II ). 
  17and democracy and to strengthen civil society within the framework of the 
EMP: the MEDA Democracy Project, which is also part of the European Initiative 
for Democracy and Human Rights. 
As an instrument for the promotion of civil society activities in the field of 
human rights and democracy, MEDA Programme is a crucial instrument of EU’s 
Foreign Policy in the Mediterranean region: in fact article 2 of 1996 MEDA 
Regulation mentions the reinforcement of political stability and of democracy 
among the three main sectors of the EMP, thus including it in the Regulation's 
primary objectives. 
Therefore, in order to make effective the implementation of such an 
objective,  MEDA Regulations contain provisions which bear a certain 
resemblance to the `human rights clauses' included in all recent EC 
agreements (see above, paragraph 2.6). According to Article 3 of the MEDA 
Regulation: “This Regulation is based on respect for democratic principles and 
the rule of law and also for human rights and fundamental freedoms, which 
constitute an essential element thereof, the violation of which element will justify 
the adoption of appropriate measures.” 
53 
The approach pursued by the EC through MEDA Democracy was strongly 
“bottom-up” in the sense that it focused on support for NGOs, grass-roots 
advocacy networks, building of awareness, and civic education
54. 
Although between 1996 and 1999 democracy funding in the 
Mediterranean region increased significantly
55, the spending on democracy 
assistance represents less than 1 euro per capita; therefore the range of work 
undertaken in the field of democratization  has been really narrow and it has 
been subjected to several limitations. 
Anyway, MEDA funds were conditional upon economic and not on political 
reforms, as it is demonstrated by Tunisia’s success in securing a 
disproportionately high share of MEDA funds. 
Actually EU’s firmer pressure and aid were exerted in relation to individual 
human rights cases than democracy, therefore the EU’s willingness to develop a 
tougher approach to human rights highlights the substantive absence   of a 
similar approach towards democracy promotion.  
 
2.4 THE CIVIL SOCIETY’S PERSPECTIVE ON DEMOCRACY 
PROMOTION POLICIES. 
 
 “Civil society makes an important input into policy making for all regions 
with which the EU has relations”
56: several legal instruments produced by 
                                                 
53 At the end of 1997, the Commission proposed a modification of Article 16 of the MEDA Regulation so as to 
provide for the possibility to suspend cooperation by qualified majority. 
54 R. YOUNGS, “The European Union and Democracy promotion in The Mediterranean: A New or Disingenuous 
Strategy?”  In Democratization Volume 9 Spring 2002 Number 1, Special issue “The European Union and 
Democracy promotion: The Case of North Africa”, edited  by Richard Gillespie and Richard Youngs, page 55. 
55 It  came to account for a significant 14 per cent of the EC’s overall democracy assistance budget, about 27 
million euros. Idem. 
56  R. YOUNGS, “The European Union and Democracy promotion in The Mediterranean: A New or Disingenuous 
Strategy?”  In Democratization Volume 9 Spring 2002 Number 1, Special issue “The European Union and 
  18European Institutions on human rights and democracy promotion  stress the key 
role played by civil society in this  field. It is crucial to the European Institutions 
to take into account civil society’s view on the issue and to work also in an 
atmosphere of consultation with NGOs because they often underlines different 
priorities or strategies. 
Moreover civil society’s opinion and warnings are useful to give an idea of 
the complexity and of the controversial nature of the issue which we are dealing 
with. 
The EC expressed its commitment to intensify the dialogue  on human 
rights and democratisation issues with civil society and NGOs, also through the 
Human Rights Contact Group meeting in the European Parliament, with the 
aim of exchanging useful information and of improving mutual understanding. 
 
In particular, it will be analysed the activity of the Euro-Mediterranean 
Human Rights Network (EMHRN), as a regional civil society network devoted 
to the promotion and protection of human rights and democracy in the Euro-
Mediterranean region, because it has followed the development of the MEDA 
Democracy Programme
57 and it proposes its own way to strengthening the 
implementation of MEDA Democracy Project in the Mediterranean Region.  
 
The EMHRN confronted with the opportunity of using a thematic or a 
regional approach to democratization processes, agrees with the EC’s view
58 that 
a  thematic approach is of relevance. However, it stresses that with the 
establishment of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership a new geo-political entity is 
in the making and it requires a clear perspective with a view to maintaining also 
a regional approach to the promotion of human rights and democracy
59. 
 
In general EMHRN states that EU institutions should consider a more 
balanced approach to the Barcelona Process by increasing funds available for 
civil society activities, independently of government interests, in the field of 
human rights and democracy under the MEDA Democracy Programme
60. 
Human rights conditions in North Africa systematically give cause for 
grave concern and are often widely eroded by governments, civil society in many 
countries is weak and has no meaningful political participation to decision making 
processes, and as consequences human rights defenders  work under precarious 
conditions; according to MEDA Democracy Programme has been under-staffed to 
                                                                                                                                      
Democracy promotion: The Case of North Africa”, edited  by Richard Gillespie and Richard Youngs. Chapter 
3.1.3. 
57Recommendations by the Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network (EMHRN) to the European Commission, 
the European Parliament and the EU member states regarding the MEDA Democracy Programme. 
58 European Commission’s communication on the “EU’s Role in Promoting Human Rights & Democratisation in 
Third Countries”  8 May 2001. 
59 Recommendations by the Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network (EMHRN) to the European Commission, 
the European Parliament and the EU member states regarding the MEDA Democracy Programme. 
60 Idem. 
  19face up such a dramatic scenario: funds allocated to the MEDA Democracy 
Programme amount to no more than one percent of the total funds allocated by 
the EU to support the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.  
 The EMHRN stresses that the EC should develop comprehensive and 
transparent policies in consultation with civil  society, but it also warns that in the 
last years  organisations which often defend government policies rather than 
human rights and democratic principles, has been beneficiary of EC’s fund. As 
consequence EMHRN urges that MEDA Democracy Programme should be aimed 
at supporting and facilitating the activities of independent representatives of 
South Mediterranean civil society and that Governments’ vetoes should not be 
accepted.  
 
2.5 AN OUTLINE ON HUMAN DEVELOPMENT AND 
DEMOCRACY PROMOTION. 
 
The fact that the promotion of human rights, democracy, the rule of law 
and good governance are an integral part of the new European Union’s strategy 
for development is fully expressed by the adoption of a Joint Statement on 
the European Community's development policy 2, in November 2000 on 
behalf  of the Commission and the Council, which is firmly grounded on the 
principle of sustainable, equitable and participatory human and social 
development
61: it is interesting to note that this document, which is focused on 
developmental strategies, states that  poverty reduction can be sustainably 
achieved only where there are functioning participatory democracies and 
accountable governments. 
The  Joint Statement, which  represents a new comprehensive 
framework for the EC's activities in promoting human rights and democratization 
in a developmental perspective, identifies institutional capacity building as a 
strategic area for Community activities.   
 
Furthermore the recent UNDP report on Arab Human Development  
2003 underlines that the strengthening of democracy, respect for human rights 
and good governance are crucial for political and economic development. In fact 
it does exist a strict correlation between weak governance and stalled growth:  
insufficient growth rates in Arab countries during the last decade were 
coupled in most cases with limited progress regarding political reform. 
The UNDP Arab Human Development report 2002 has concluded that 
Arab countries suffer from a freedom deficit, which is characterised by a low 
record in terms of governance and fundamental freedoms; moreover political 
participation is less advanced in the Arab world than in any other 
                                                 
61 European Commission’s communication on the “EU’s Role in Promoting Human Rights & Democratisation in 
Third Countries” ( 8 May 2001), Introduction. 
 
  20region and  representative democracy is not always genuine and sometimes 
absent
62. 
 
2.6 “THE INCLUSION OF RESPECT FOR DEMOCRATIC 
PRINCIPLES AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN AGREEMENTS BETWEEN 
THE COMMUNITY AND THIRD COUNTRIES”: THE HUMAN RIGHT 
CLAUSE. 
 
Since the early 1990s, the EC has included more or less systematically in 
its bilateral trade and co-operation agreements with third countries, including 
association agreements such as Mediterranean Agreements and the Cotonou 
Agreement, the so-called human rights clause, which defines “respect for 
human rights and democracy as ‘essential elements’ in the EU's relationship”
63. 
This clause is unique in bilateral agreements
64, and the approach that it 
promotes has been further developed in the Cotonou agreement signed with 
African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries in June 2000, which is based on 
respect for human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law, and 
on good governance. 
 
………………………… 
 
     In 1995 the Council adopted a decision which spells out the basic modalities 
and the essential elements of the human rights clause, in order to ensure 
consistency in the text used in bilateral agreements and its implementation. Since 
this Council decision of May 1995, the human rights clause has been included 
in all subsequently negotiated bilateral agreements. 
The model of “human rights standard clause” outlined by the Council 
Decision consists of a provision which states that respect for fundamental human 
rights and democratic principles, as laid down in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights of 1948 and in other international legal instruments, such as the 
Helsinki Final  Act and the Paris Charter for a New Europe, does inspire the 
European Foreign Policy, and then the European external assistance: 
democratic principles are essential part of co-operation and association 
agreements with Third Countries. 
As  far the substantive meaning of the expression “essential part of the 
agreement” is concerned, the Council Decision  establishes  that a final provision 
dealing with cases of non-execution of the agreement requires that each party of 
the agreement must consult the other parties, before taking measures against 
non execution save cases of special urgency: one of this cases relates to 
                                                 
62 COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES Brussels, 21.05.2003 COM (2003) 294 final 
COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT on “ 
Reinvigorating EU actions on Human Rights and democratisation with Mediterranean partners “ Strategic 
guidelines. 
63 European Commission’s communication on the “EU’s Role in Promoting Human Rights & Democratisation in 
Third Countries” ( 8 May 2001), Introduction. 
64 European Commission’s communication on the “EU’s Role in Promoting Human Rights & Democratisation in 
Third Countries” ( 8 May 2001), Introduction. 
 
  21breaches of an `essential element of the agreement; in sum if a party of 
the agreement realizes a violation of democratic principles and human rights, the 
other parties can suspend the execution of  the agreements as countermeasure 
to such a breach, actually suspension works as a sanction against the party that 
does not comply with the obligations arising under the agreement. 
 
……………………………… 
 
The Commission’s Communication on the inclusion of respect for 
democratic principles and human rights in Agreements between the 
Community and Third Countries begins by stating that “a commitment to 
respect, promote and protect human rights and democratic principles is a key 
element of the European Community's relations with third countries”
65, which is 
inserted in the body of the Union Treaty. As democratic  principles’ promotion is 
concerned, the EC has a broad range of instruments and “taking account of 
human rights in contractual relations with third countries is one of those 
instruments.”
66 
According to this communication references to human rights in 
agreements with third countries are based on the positions the Community 
has taken by: 
 
- “subscribing to universal and regional instruments and assuming 
responsibility for promoting the principles of democracy, the rule of law and 
respect for human rights (paragraph 5 of the preamble to the Single European 
Act)”; 
- “making respect for, and promotion of, these principles one of the 
general objectives of Community development cooperation policy (Union Treaty, 
Article 130U) and one of the objectives of the common foreign and security 
policy (Union Treaty, Article J1(2))”; 
- “by inserting clauses on human rights into economic and cooperation 
agreements with third countries” - paragraph 10 of the resolution on human 
rights, democracy and development of the Council and the Member States 
meeting within the Council,28 November 1991; 
-  “by recognizing democratic principles and human rights as an essential 
element of its contractual relations.” 
 
As the EC is determined to adopt a non-discriminatory approach
67 in 
Community's contractual relations with third countries, in this communication it 
sets out the basic references to human rights and democratic principles 
for Community agreements with third parties and establishes that the new 
directives on the issue should include in the preamble references to democratic 
principles and human rights values and legal instruments, and in the body of the 
                                                 
65 COMMISSION COMMUNICATION “On the inclusion of respect for  democratic principles and human rights in 
Agreements between the Community and Third Countries”. COM (95)216 of 23 May 1995. Preamble. 
66 Idem. 
67 Already in 1993 the Commission expressed such a commitment by drafting guidelines on these issues in 
Decision of 26 January 1993, MIN (93)1137, point XIV. 
  22agreement the following articles, which all together, and in sequence, provide  a 
substantive structure aimed to protect and implement respect for democratic 
principles in external relations: 
 
- firstly, the insertion of an article defining the essential elements in 
such away: "Respect for the democratic principles and fundamental human rights 
established by [the Universal Declaration of Human Rights]/[the Helsinki Final Act 
and the Charter of Paris for a New Europe] inspires the domestic and external 
policies of the Community and of [the country or group of countries concerned] 
and constitutes an essential element of this agreement"; 
 
- secondly, the insertion of an article  on non-execution of the 
agreement: "If either Party considers that the other Party has failed to fulfil an 
obligation under this Agreement, it may take appropriate measures. Before so 
doing, except in cases of special urgency…."; 
- thirdly, the insertion of interpretative declarations of the non 
execution article: "… The Parties agree, for the purpose of the correct 
interpretation and practical application of this Agreement, that the term "cases of 
special urgency"… means a case of the material breach of the Agreement by one 
of the  Parties. A material breach of the Agreement consists in… violation of 
essential elements of the Agreement.” 
 
                                                
In the structure of this fundamental document it has a key role to play 
also the ANNEX 1 on  Standard wording for clauses on human rights 
which provides complementary clauses for the article on non-execution
68 and 
general interpretative declarations useful to improve the effectiveness of the 
entire communication. 
 
................................. 
 
The  European Commission’s Communication on the European 
Union’s role in promoting Human Rights and Democratisation in Third 
Countries
69 welcomes  the inclusion since 1992 in all  the EC agreements with 
third countries of the  clause defining respect for human rights and 
democracy and it states that this clause is an ‘essential element’ in the EU's 
relationship and that it is unique in bilateral agreements. 
As it was already seen (paragraph 2.1), this communication does not try 
to rewrite guidelines for EU’s external policies, rather it seeks to insert this policy 
in the context of the Commission's overall strategic approach in such relations 
also by considering that the EU is engaged  in a political dialogue of varying 
degrees of formality with all countries.  
In many cases, the basis for a dialogue on human rights and 
democracy is exactly the ‘essential elements’ clause
70  as it was defined in 
 
68 Namely the explicit suspension or "Baltic" clause and the general non-execution or "Bulgarian" clause. 
69 EUROPEAN COMMISSION Brussels, 8 May 2001 COM(2001) 252 final COMMUNICATION FROM THE 
COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT THE EUROPEAN UNION'S ROLE IN 
PROMOTING HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRATISATION IN THIRD COUNTRIES. Preamble. 
70 Idem paragraph 3.1.1 
  23Commission’s Communication on the inclusion of respect for democratic 
principles and human rights in Agreements between the Community and Third 
Countries. 
The EC’s Communication underlines the strong effect that the non-
execution article can exercise in the implementation of the human rights clause, 
but it also is convinced that “EU's insistence on including essential elements 
clauses is not intended to signify a negative or punitive approach”
71: the 
Communication stresses that the clause is meant to promote dialogue and 
positive measures, the accession, ratification and implementation of international 
human rights instruments. In my view it is as interesting, as paradoxical, that the 
EC affirms that “the dialogue on human rights that they enable should be a two-
way one, with the EU also agreeing to discuss human rights and 
democratisation issues within its own borders”.  
As the formulation of the “human Rights clause” is quite vague the 
Commission stresses the fact that a more systematic inclusion of human rights 
and democracy issues into political dialogue could give substance to the essential 
elements clause and permit to identify the most effective measures needed to 
build political stability. 
 
……………………………………. 
 
The  Commission’s Communication to the Council and the 
European Parliament on “Reinvigorating EU actions on Human Rights 
and democratisation with Mediterranean partners”
72, in addition to the 
principles and guidelines affirmed by the EC in previous communications, sets out 
working guidelines to achieve the goal of democratization and human rights 
promotion in co-operation with the EU’s partner countries in the Mediterranean 
region
73. 
It proposes 10 concrete recommendations to improve the dialogue 
between the EU and its Mediterranean partners on democracy promotion, as the 
implementation of Human Rights standards in the region does not comply with 
international norms. 
The communication underlines that the major objective  within the EMP
74 
requires a strengthening of democracy and respect for Human Rights; the 
achievement of  this goal and the establishment of  long-lasting relationships, 
based on reciprocity, solidarity, partnership and co-development in the EC’s view 
are improved by the inclusion of the Human Rights clause in bilateral relations 
(Association Agreements)  between the  EU and Euro-Med partners: such an 
inclusion “confirms and develops the objectives of the Barcelona Declaration. It 
provides a basis for developing dialogue and co-operation with the Mediterranean 
                                                 
71 Idem. 
72 COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES Brussels, 21.05.2003 COM (2003) 294 final 
COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT on “ 
Reinvigorating EU actions on Human Rights and democratisation with Mediterranean partners “ Strategic 
guidelines. 
73 Idem, preamble. 
74 That is the creation of “an area of dialogue, exchange and co-operation guaranteeing peace, stability and 
prosperity. 
  24partners in the areas of good governance, Human Rights and fundamental 
freedoms and the rule of law”
75. 
 
…………………………... 
 
EURO-MEDITERRANEAN AGREEMENT 
ESTABLISHING AN ASSOCIATION 
BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 
AND ITS MEMBER STATES, OF THE ONE PART, 
AND THE PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF 
ALGERIA, OF THE OTHER PART 
 
 
ARTICLE 2 
 
“Respect for the democratic principles and fundamental human rights 
established by the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights shall inspire the domestic and 
international policies of the Parties and 
shall constitute an essential element of this Agreement.” 
 
An important reason for including this standard clause in agreements with 
third countries is to state the right of the Community to suspend or 
terminate an agreement when third countries concerned do not respect 
human rights, otherwise  the EC should rely only on general international law. 
Thus suspension or termination can take place, in a manner consistent 
with the rules of customary international law codified in the Vienna 
Conventions on the Law of Treaties. 
The human rights clause does not establish new standards in the 
international protection of human rights, its   basic term of reference is the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which is customary law. 
Moreover the human rights clause does not seek to transform the basic 
nature of agreements, it simply constitutes a mutual reaffirmation of commonly 
shared values and principles and a precondition for economic and other forms of 
cooperation under the agreements, and expressly allows for and regulates 
suspension in case of non-compliance with democratic principles and human 
rights standards. 
This approach was expressly confirmed by the ECJ in Portugal v. 
Council  (1996), where the Court observed that an important function of the 
human rights clause could be just the above mentioned. 
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  25CHAPTER 3 
THE CHALLENGE OF DEMOCRACY IN NORTH AFRICA: 
THE MEDITERRANEAN SOUTHERN SIDE’S POINT OF 
VIEW 
 
Much academic analyses have focused on the question of whether North 
Africa constitutes or does not constitute an exception to the established  theories 
on democratization: just over a decade ago the region was omitted from a study 
on democracy in developing countries
76 “as having little democratic experience to 
learn from and very weak prospects of transition to democracy…”
77.  
Notwithstanding the “wave of democracy” - which went through the 
Eastern Countries after the end of the Cold War - did not involve North Africa
78, 
during the late eighties the region started to live an increasing popular agitation 
for democracy: the “optimists” have tended to interpret any broadening of 
political participation or of civil society’s involvement as  fundamental and 
determinant steps in the process for democratization; the “ pessimists” instead 
stressed the strength of cultural  and religious models as obstacles to positive 
attitudes towards democracy and human rights promotion
79. 
This debate has generated a discussion on the definition of civil society in 
this region and on whether democratization requires an advance of secularism: it 
must be recognized that it becomes more and more difficult to deal with the 
issue because of the role played by some essential Islamic concepts and by the 
existence in the region of diverse political  regimes, Islamist forces, economic 
structures and societies
80. 
 
Despite pressures exerted by national and international actors in favour of 
political liberalization, North African Governments have been reluctant to 
adopt substantive reforms on the way of democratization process and 
they, even the most progressive ones, appear intent on maintaining authoritarian 
rule. 
Some cautioned that this approach can be  due to the adverse 
consequences which are often caused by a period of transition from an 
authoritarian regime to a democratic one: first of all, transition to democracy is 
commonly an extremely destabilizing period during which elites pursue a more 
aggressive external policy; secondly, during transition to democracy the collapse 
of the established order can lead to nationalism; thirdly democracy could make 
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  26increase ethnic conflicts inside the country; finally the above mentioned factors 
combined with political Islam could exacerbate the already exiting threats to 
peace and stability
81. Moreover, critics points out that  between democracy and 
peace there is not a statistically convincing demonstration of causality
82 and that 
democracy does not always guarantee good or efficient government.  
In this perspective, the French Foreign Minister noted, concerning 
government attitudes toward democracy, that “Tunisia is going backwards, 
Algeria is going round in circles, and Morocco in undecided about which direction 
to take”
83 and as the EuroMeSco Reports point out the process of political 
transition to democracy in North African countries is at different stages and 
presents different features, in some cases it is not homogeneous even within the 
boundaries of a single country. 
However democracy maintains a fundamental merit: it leaves room for 
choices or corrective actions to bad choices. Therefore even if “democracy have 
not existed in North Africa in the past… nor does is exist now… is there any 
inherent reason for it not to exist in the future.”
84 
 
Democracy requires adherence to some – not controversial - values, such 
as pluralism and access to fundamental freedoms and human rights; although 
some scholars have seek to determine whether or not the emergence of 
democracy does require certain economic and social conditions, there is no 
compelling evidence about that; then it can not be claim that  certain societies 
are not enough “mature” for democracy, it would be almost a casuistic 
justification for the existence of authoritarian regimes. 
 
Actually if the North African Governments’ reluctance to take substantive 
steps towards democracy can be explained of course by referring to the adverse 
consequences caused by the transition period, it is also true that these 
problems are often caused by the length and the degree of cruelty of 
dictatorial rule, rather than to the specific characteristic of the society  
of  a country going towards democratic reforms: other factors must be 
considered. 
 
Everybody knows that authoritarianism is an obstacle to the 
consolidation of a tradition of dialogue, as consequence in a period of transition 
to democracy any political opening is likely to lead to the formation of a 
multitude of groups   which may be formed along racial, ethnic, or religious 
lines and which, in absence of structures capable of aggregating interests, may 
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  27pursue their objectives through the direct control of power
85: this actually 
happened in Algeria. 
 
Anyway the most formidable obstacle to democratization process in North 
Africa is represented by each of the regimes currently in power
86, no one of 
them does want a substantive opening to democratization because it would imply 
their demise. North African Governments are perfectly aware that international 
institutions can not interfere in their internal affairs and force them to take 
actions for democracy promotion, but – as they want to prevent western 
criticisms – they are adopting measures aimed to promote their image of 
enlightened rulers on the international scene.  
Moreover regimes, especially in Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco, adopted 
commendable policies and achieved positive results
87 by improving educational 
and health standards; now they claim credit for their successes and as   
undeniable problems grow, ruling leaders are able to convince their citizens that 
they are not dealing with problems, but with challenges launched by external 
factors and that only their regimes can meet successfully those challenges
88.  
Even if someone can cautioning that this approach could have the merit 
of being pragmatic and then useful to gradual reforms, North African societies 
believe that most measures adopted by their governments are nice masks behind 
which rule continues to be exercise by force, people endure their suffering in 
forced silence and Islamists take advantages by such a situation. 
  
The above mentioned obstacle leads to the second one: the attitude of 
citizens towards politics, which are barred from any meaningful form of 
participation to the political process. Even the role played by opposition parties is 
not relevant, because their existence depends upon the goodwill of the ruling 
government. However some observers stress the fact that in these countries it is 
growing a desire for a more active political and social involvement
89 
 
Finally the European Union’s inability to devise an effective policy 
toward the region may become a new obstacle to democratization process in the 
Mediterranean Region: little progress has been made towards the objectives 
contained in the Barcelona Declaration. 
 According to some critics, North African Governments see the EMP  as 
something that might bring material and political benefits at little cost: measures 
such as privatization required by the EMP have been implemented in such a way 
that most of their benefits have gone to small elites; when the EU asked for the 
implementation of measures, such as those relating to democracy and human 
rights, which do not bring direct economic benefits, governments bristled. 
Moreover the actual popular attitude towards Western approaches 
is negative, despite the human rights clause’s “good intentions” and despite the 
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  28fact that the EU committed itself to turn the Mediterranean region in an area of  
shared peace and prosperity through the EMP, even the simple idea of security, 
according to North African view, is structured in an unilateralist way, that is only 
from the European perspective, without any substantive evaluation of North 
Africa’s interests and needs
90. 
In sum in North Africa it is widely believed that “the Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership is a thinly disguised form of imperialism designed to exploit and 
dominate the Arabs, and that the EU will do nothing to destabilize regimes 
needed to carry out its plan.”
91 
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  29CHAPTER 4 
THE EUROPEAN UNION AND DEMOCRACY PROMOTION 
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN: WHICH STRATEGY? 
 
4.1 A NEW, AN INEFFECTIVE OR AN INSINCERE EU’s 
STRATEGY FOR DEMOCRACY IN NORTH AFRICA? 
 
Prior to the nineties, European concern with democracy and human rights 
in the Southern Mediterranean region was subordinated to the strategic logic of 
the Cold War, which led to militate against democratization processes in the 
region.  
However, the European Union since the early nineties has come to view 
the Mediterranean as a relevant region that deserves specific and long-term 
policies focused on democracy promotion, because of the strategic and cultural 
challenges which arise in the region; particularly in the field of democracy and 
human rights promotion, the EU has sought to develop initiatives capable of 
“challenging what many see as a Washington’s prominence.”
92 
Since 1991 Development Council resolution committed the EU to placing 
the promotion of Human Rights at the centre of EU’s foreign policy: resources 
allocated by the EU for democracy promotion initiatives have been tripled during 
the nineties (MEDA Democracy Program, see paragraph 2.3) and the European 
Commission’s project in this sensible field have been grouped together within an 
European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (see paragraph 2.2).  
 
The democracy promotion aim was institutionalized and regionalized 
through the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, which was acclaimed as an 
historic change in the EU’s foreign policy,  especially for its democracy promotion 
agenda. 
However Barcelona commitments were still submitted to certain 
limitations and anyway they were inadequate in comparison to the declared 
objectives: the EMP’s commitments were too vague and uncertain alongside the 
economic timetable; democratic principles were not properly specified and the 
real dimension of the principle of non intervention was uneasy to define.  
 
The central commitment of the EU policy makers, at the first stage of the 
Euro-Mediterranean democracy promotion policy, was to reform instruments and 
procedures in order to standardize, and consequently depoliticize, 
provisions dealing with democracy in the entire region.  
If it ought to be recognized that the key aim was always the extension 
of the  European global presence beyond Europe’s boundaries
93, the 
architects of the new European commitment to democracy promotion insisted 
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  30also that such a policy reflected  a genuine reassessment of  EU’s interests
94: in 
EU’s point of view political liberalization was the best tool in order as to achieve 
both stability and moderation, as to improve economic growth; the Barcelona 
D e c l a r a t i o n  r e f l e c t s  t h i s   k i n d  o f  r e asoning as it predicts that economic 
liberalization, political reforms, cultural understanding and strategic stability are 
mutually reinforcing. 
 
If the  European commitment to democracy promotion in North 
Africa is genuine, it must be recognized that it is not just pure altruism: in 
fact political opening combined with social and economic co-operation, in EU’s 
perspective – which is completely different from the reasoning of Southern 
partners, as it was seen above - would favour well being in North Africa and  
security in Europe. In line with this  strategy, the EU is trying to address the 
social and economic roots of radical Islam with the aim of reducing anti-western 
feelings in the Mediterranean region. 
 
However in practice the EU’s declared strategy does not work as 
well as it was predicted: the European Governments, especially the Southern 
ones, caution that they are mainly concerned to ensure that the period of 
transition to democracy does not threats political stability and security, for 
instance trough indiscriminate migratory flows.  No EU member state maintains 
that democracy  promotion agenda should endanger the existing regimes in 
North Africa, some expressly see the attempted imposition of democratic values 
as one of the most dangerous threats to the West’s own security, to the extent 
that such an imposition could provoke violent extremist reactions against 
Western Governments. 
 
Moreover, despite the  insistence on the idea that The Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership can help to lay  the foundations for peace settlement, 
in practice the EMP is submitted to the peace process in the Middle East 
area: paradoxically a more active democracy promotion strategy needs a 
progress in the peace process, rather than instilling political moderation and 
opening
95. 
Consequently the European Union committed itself to elaborate, and 
implement, a long term strategy focused 
 
- on a discrete pressure not on democratization issues, but  on the 
development of different factors which are precursors of democracy;  
- on a widening of the space available for initiative promoted by civil 
society; 
- on the promotion and improvement of democratic awareness or capacity 
among people; 
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  31- on facilitating the move from a rentier forms of economic activities 
towards a varied commercial structure; 
- finally on favouring a convergence of Islamist opinions around basic 
democratic principles
96. 
 
In sum European Governments are trying to improve basic economic and 
social rights rather than “making relations  in any substantive sense conditional 
upon the adoption of a set of western liberal democratic structures”
97 which the 
North African societies and governments could feel as too invasive or even as 
conditioning their internal  affairs. 
Such a “middle  way” approach was welcomed not only by experts of 
democratization processes, but mainly by Southern European Member States 
which are directly confronting with the risks caused by the period of transition to 
democracy
98. 
 
Then, as consequences of the above underlined factors, the EMP’s 
practical  and practicable focus is the establishment  of  a discourse on 
democracy : the Barcelona Process is relevant  because it for the first time 
introduced democratization issues into the Euro-Mediterranean relations, stressed 
the added value of pluralism and trust among partners, by focusing on 
socialization dynamics
99  rather than on substantive punitive 
conditionality in relation to democratic shortfalls. 
Definitely the European Union promoted an “holistic approach”
100 which 
underlines the key role played by each single factor of development – political, 
economic, cultural, and social. 
 
4.2 THE EU’S APPROACH: BOTTOM-UP AND TOP-DOWN 
STRATEGIES. 
 
European Union’s democracy promotion commitment has also the effect 
of provoking a debate on the way in which an international actor can most 
effectively help to construct high quality and balanced democratic institutions in 
Third Countries; by using a classification, which of course is artificial, the 
following two are the possible strategies: the first one is the so called top-down  
strategy  which is   supported by coercive policies, the second one is the 
bottom-up strategy which operate through positive approaches
101.  
Most analysts expressed their strong perplexities over the wisdom of 
punitive strategies because these often risk being counterproductive in the 
construction of positive consent around democratic rules and participatory 
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  32procedures
102; these analysts do not deny that political conditionality has a role 
to play in democratisation processes, but they affirm also that conditionality is  
able to produce desirable effects only under certain circumstances (for instance 
when the imposition of an economic sanctions can accelerate the demise of an 
authoritarian regime). 
 
Therefore in the last years developmental policies in the field of 
democracy and human rights promotion have been characterized by a deep 
attention “to the positive assistance of modest liberalization measures in the 
realms of civil society and economic governance, and the grounds for expecting 
that these will eventually spill over into pressure for democratization”
103. Such a 
bottom-up strategy moreover encounters several difficulties because it often 
lacks a suitable counterpart on an intergovernmental level (institutions in North  
Africa are designed in order to encourage only a coercive top-down approach); 
moreover it is very difficult to develop a democracy promotion policy that does 
not conflict with other areas of co-operation among Euro-Med partners, for 
instance some critics pointed out that  the economic liberalization promoted by 
EMP is likely to destabilize and to reinforce forms of neo-patrimonialism
104. 
 
Experiences of democratization processes in Eastern Europe suggested to 
the European Community  that democracy promotion in North Africa must focus 
on three activities which are able to reinforce bottom-up dynamics: 
-  support for civil society; 
-  extension of economic liberalization; 
-  sponsorship of  the “good governance agenda” in co-operation with 
the International Monetary Found and the World Bank. 
 
In sum by considering  that the EMP is mainly a project of partnership-
building, and that the EU policy in the Mediterranean region “has an infinite 
temporal horizon when it comes to democracy promotion”
105, the EU preferred to 
place the emphasis more on positive forms of conditionality than on 
negative ones, such as sanctions, which in a certain sense represents 
“conditionality old style”. 
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